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Abstract
Since objective news coverage is vital to democracy, captured media can seriously
distort collective decisions. The current paper develops a voting model where citizens
are uncertain about the welfare e¤ects induced by alternative policy options and derive
information about those e¤ects from the mass media. The media might however secretly
collude with interest groups in order to inuence the public opinion. In the case of voting
over the level of a productivity-enhancing public bad, it is shown that an increase in the
concentration of rm ownership makes the occurrence of media bias more likely. Although
media bias is not always welfare worsening, conditions for it to raise welfare are restrictive.
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1 Introduction
Messages communicated by the mass media to the citizenry can have a tremendous impact
upon collective decision-making. On the one hand, to the extent that newspapers and
television gather information and make it available to citizens, they can dramatically
increase votersability to make intelligent choices. On the other hand, the medias role in
strengthening democracy may be put in jeopardy by special interest groups that use the
news providers to manipulate the public opinion.
Under which conditions can one expect journalism to be independent and news cover-
age to be objective? What are the welfare e¤ects from manipulated media? The current
paper aims at shedding light on these issues by developing a simple model of incompletely
informed citizens who vote over policy, and mass media that have access to superior
information, but can be captured by interest groups.
To illustrate the potential impact of captured media on democratic decision-making, I
study the choice about the level of a productivity-enhancing public project that causes an
uncertain social damage. Many real-world examples t the model. One is governmental
regulation of production techniques that might give rise to ecological disasters. Another
example is a military attack to a foreign country, conducted in order to lower the price of
an imported input. A further example is authorizing the merger of two companies that
plan to form a monopoly; the monopoly price is formally equivalent to a public bad, and
the sinergies due to the merger exemplify the productivity increase.1
Voters are assumed to obtain information on the risks associated with the public
project from the media. I focus on the benchmark case where the media sector is a private
monopoly. Although this is an extreme case, references to a media monopolyabound
in media research, e. g. in the title of Bagdikians (2000) inuential monography. The
preponderance of private ownership in contemporary media systems2 along with the very
1Roemer (1993) provides a political-economic analysis of the determination of the level of a
productivity-enhancing public bad in the case of complete information.
2Djankov et al. (2003) analyze the ownership structure of top newspapers and television channels;
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high level of industry concentration in the media sector3 suggest that private monopoly
is a model that deserves close scrutiny.
I assume that the media cannot be forced to objectively and accurately report their
information. By presenting some facts and omitting others, by choice of emphasis, and
by relience on slick press releases and independent expertshandpicked by PR rms, the
media are in a position to manipulate the beliefs of the electorate. Therefore, they can
inuence voting outcomes. This opportunity is recognized by interest groups, which may
eventually bribe the media to get their preferred messages transmitted.
Bribes stand for various forms of transfers made by interest groups to people in the me-
dia sector in order to secure favorable reports. Examples range from highly remunerated
speaking engagements of anchormen and journalists before associations and corporations,
provision of cushy jobs with industry, and private invitations to breathe the special air
of the upper upper-class. In some countries, industrial rms directly own televisions and
newspapers. In this case, interest groups may bribe media personalities just by paying
them a salary that is substantially above its market level.4
The model highlights the role played by rm ownership in determining media inde-
pendence. It predicts that, ceteris paribus, a higher level of ownership concentration
increases the probability of captured media. The largest shareholders disproportionately
benet from the protability increase induced by the public project. Since their interests
strongly conict with those of the median voter, largest shareholders exhibit the strongest
incentive to manipulate the electorate. A high level of wealth concentration is conducive
these are dened as the ve largest daily newspapers, as measured by share in total circulation, and the
ve largest television stations, as measured by share of viewing. In the U.S., all top media are privately
owned. In France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the U.K. private newspapers have a share between 83 and
100 %, while private television has a share between 39 and 61 %. Although the share of private television
in Italy is only 39 %, the controlling shareholder is also the current prime minister.
3Six multinationals dominate the media sector worldwide. As they own stock in each other and
cooperate in joint media ventures, they are referred to as a media monopoly by Bagdikian (2000). In the
U.S., all major sources of TV news are divisions of only ve, largely intertwined, conglomerates.
4Paul Krugman has recently drawn the attention to the conicts of interest of the U.S. media: The
handful of organizations that supply most people with their news have major commercial interests that
inevitably tempt them to slant their coverage (New York Times, 11.29.02). For a highly documented
picture of the corporate control of U.S. media, see McChesney (1999).
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to captured media because it provides the media with a patron which has more to benet
from untruthful reporting and which is therefore willing to pay more for this.
The kind of media capture identied in this paper does not necessarily reduce social
welfare. There is scope for dishonest media to be welfare improving because the political
equilibrium with full information is distorted. While this distortion arises as soon as
median and average wealth do not coincide, the conditions under which captured media
raise social welfare are shown to be restrictive.
If the disproportionate inuence of the wealthy on public opinion formation brings
about a welfare loss, some form of public regulation of the media sector could be welcome.
The model suggests that the case for regulation is stronger, the more concentrated the
distribution of wealth is.
Anecdotical evidence about the U.S. suggests that wealth concentration might be an
empirically signicant determinant of media reliability, of course one among others. Over
the past two decades, the U.S. society has experienced a tremendous growth of wealth
inequality, along with a loss of trust of people in the media.5
A recent literature has identied various channels of media inuence on politics. In
Strömberg (2004), the media transmit politicianscampaign promises to the electorate.
Due to economies of scale, the news media provide more space to issues of interest to
large groups. Such a bias translates into a policy bias in favor of large groups. Chan and
Suen (2004) study a Downsian framework with incompletely informed voters. In their
model, the media has exogenous policy preferences and makes statements that maximize
the probability of election of the party it prefers. In Baron (2004), it is the preferences of
journalists for inuence, or their career concern, that are at the root of medias inuence
upon politics.
5A study of several yearly surveys undertaken by the Times Mirror Center for The People & The
Press concludes that the news medias negative ratingrose from 51.8 percent in 1985 to 60.3 percent
in 1995 (Hess, 1996). In a survey report of 1999, lack of credibility is still mentioned as the single most
important problem facing journalism. On the contemporary rise of wealth inequality in the U.S., see e.
g. Wol¤ (2002).
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Capture, as a source of media bias, is at the core of Besley and Prat (2004), which is
the paper that is closest to the current one. Besley and Prat study how the structure of
the media industry a¤ects political accountability when voters cannot timely observe the
performance of the incumbent government. The role of the media is to provide information
about the governments ability, before voters may decide to reelect it. In their model, only
veriable information can be reported; however, a bad government may buy the medias
silence. Besley and Prat show that the media sector is more likely to be corrupt if there
are few outlets. Media plurality tends to ensure objective news coverage because it makes
it harder for the government to bribe the whole media industry.
Besley and Prats model and the current one explore two very di¤erent settings in
which media can become corrupt. In their model, the media sector may be captured by
the government, voters have common interests, and multiple media outlets are present.
In the current model, there is a multiplicity of private agents that may capture the media,
voters have conicting interests, and there is a monopolistic media industry.
The model in the current paper posits rational voters that understand the potential
incentives of the media to manipulate their reports.6 Following the literature on strategic
information transmission pioneered by Crawford and Sobel (1982), in the model of this
paper there is a sender (the media monopoly) who observes a signal about the true
state of the world and then transmits a message to receivers(the voters), who choose
an action that determines payo¤s. In spirit, the current model is related to the one
developed by Benabou and Laroque (1992), who investigate the manipulation of an asset
market through announcements by an insider that also trades the asset. While in their
model the sender aims at manipulating a market process, in the current one the sender
tries to manipulate a political process.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Equilibria
are characterized in Section 3, where the role of wealth concentration is discussed. Section
6Mullainhatan and Shleifer (2002) investigate the emergence and impact of media bias when users do
not form Bayesian beliefs.
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4 develops a welfare analysis. Section 5 concludes by reviewing some of the questions left
open by this article. All proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
2 The model
The economy is populated by a continuum of agents, the mass of which is normalized
to unity. Agents are denoted by i 2 [0; 1]  I. Each agent inelastically supplies one
unit of labor to the rm sector. To simplify the notation, there is just one rm in the
economy, representing the entire, competitive, sector. The distribution of rm ownership
is summarized by  : I !IR+, the fraction of the rm owned by agents.  satisesR
I
idi = 1, is continuous and increasing, and admits a unique maximum (at i = 1). The
median of the ownership distribution is less than the average: :5  m  1.
Agents have common preferences summarized by the following von Neuman-Morgenstern
utility function:
Ui = yi   !D(x): (1)
The variable yi denotes agent is consumption of the private good, while x is the amount
of the public bad. The state of the world ! can take two values, 0 and 1; each state
occurs with equal probability. The function D :IR+ !IR+ represents the damage caused
by the public bad, which only materializes if ! = 1. The damage function is increasing
and convex: D0 > 0, D00  0.
An agents level of private consumption is given by
yi = wi + i  (zi   !)2: (2)
The variable wi denotes the wage income, while  is the rms prot. The third term
on the r.h.s. of (2) captures possible private benets from guessing the underlying state
of the world. Each agent i 2 I takes an action zi 2IR and there is a consumption loss
which is minimized if the action equals the state; the magnitude of the consumption loss
depends on the parameter   0.
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The rm produces the private good according to the production function
Y = g(x)f(N); (3)
where N is the employment level. The functions f : I !IR+ and g :IR+ !IR+ are strictly
increasing and concave: f 0 > 0 > f 00, g0 > 0 > g00. In order to ensure an interior solution,
g0(0) =1 and g0(1) = 0 are assumed.
There is one agent in the population, denoted by j 2 (0; 1), that runs a media enter-
prise. This activity entails two prerogatives: rst, it gives agent j access to priviledged
information about the state of the world; second, it enables agent j to communicate that
information to the whole population. Agent j is referred to as the journalist. His superior
information about the underlying state comes from a signal s 2 f0; 1g that the journalist
privately observes. With probability p 2 (1=2; 1), this signal is equal to the true state,
while with probability 1  p the journalist is misinformed about the state. The journalist
reports a message r 2 f0; 1g about the state of the world to the population. The latter
utilizes the report to update its beliefs.
The journalists utility function is the same as the one of everybody else in the econ-
omy, except that he might also care about the core principles of his profession, namely
objectivity and accuracy. Formally, we assume
Uj = yj   !D(x)  jjr   sj;
where j  0 is the value to the journalist of making a truthful report.7 This value
is assumed to be private information. Specically, a journalists type may be either
opportunistic or idealistic. The opportunistic type has j = 0 and prior probability 1 ;
the idealistic type has j =  > 0 and occurs with probability  2 (0; 1). The journalists
type and the signal are independently distributed.
7Alternatively, the journalist faces a penalty if caught lying; j captures the expected utility loss of
lying, which depends on the level of the penalty and the probability of escaping discovery.
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The sequence of events is as follows. At date t = 0:5 the journalist learns his type j.
At date t = 1, the journalist can choose one agent to match with. Matching causes some
arbitrarily small costs  > 0 to the journalist. In case of agreement between the journalist
and the contacted agent, these two are said to build a coalition; the journalists partner,
denoted by a 2 I, is called the associate. By forming a coalition, agents j and a agree on
two issues: the medias report and a side payment. Both report and payment can be made
contingent on the signal observed by the journalist, i.e. j shares his information about
the state of the world with a.8 The outcome of bargaining between the two agents is given
by the generalized Nash solution for bargaining games with incomplete information, due
to Harsanyi and Selten (1972).9
At date t = 1:5 the journalist observes the signal about the state of the world; the
journalist shares this information with his associate, if he has one. At date t = 2 the
media report a message to the population in accordance with the agreement stipulated at
t = 1. If no media coalition was formed at t = 1, the journalist unilaterally chooses the
report. The voters only observe the report; they do not observe whether a media coalition
was built or not. Upon having received the report, the voters revise their beliefs about
the underlying state in accordance with Bayesrule.
At date t = 3 agents choose their action zi and vote on the level x of the public bad;
the level of the public bad is determined according to the majority rule. At date t = 4 a
general competitive economic equilibrium occurs.
8Thus, truthful disclosure of the signal is assumed to be enforceable within the relationship between
the journalist and the associate, whereas this is not possible in the relationship between the journalist and
the media users. The idea behind this modeling is that media coalitions are strategic alliances involving
a small number of parties. Hence, the corresponding transaction costs of verifying the signal transmitted
by the informed party are relatively low.
9The assumptions of matching and cooperative bargaining are often used e. g. in models of the labor
market. In the current setting, those assumptions keep the model tractable. If we allowed the journalist
to simultaneously bargain with every other agent, we would run into a complex problem of common
agency.
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3 Determination of equilibrium
The model is analyzed by backward induction, i.e. agents hold rational expectations.
3.1 Markets
The purely economic part of the model is standard. The representative rm takes prices
as given and demands labor so as to maximize its prot
 = g(x)f(N)  wN;
where w is the competitive wage and the private good is used as the numéraire-good.
Labor supply is xed at 1 and in a competitive equilibrium everybody works. Routine
computations show that in equilibrium the wage is given by
w = g(x)f 0(1): (4)
Equilibrium prots are given by
 = g(x); (5)
where   f(1) f 0(1) > 0 is proportional to the di¤erence between average and marginal
labor productivity. As g is an increasing function, both prot and wage increase with the
level of the public bad.
3.2 Voting
The equilibrium level of the public bad is the one which beats all alternatives in pairwise
comparisons based on majority voting. In order to characterize voterspreferences over
the level of the public bad, notice that an agents indirect expected utility is given by
EUi = w
 + i   Li   D(x); (6)
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where Li is the expected private loss induced by failing to guess the underlying state and
 = Pr(! = 1jr) is the equilibrium posterior probability assigned to state 1 by all agents
but a and j.10
Inserting (4) and (5) into (6) yields
EUi = g(x) [f
0(1) + i]  D(x)  Li. (7)
Since g(x) and  D(x) are concave, preferences for the public bad are single-peaked.
Hence, there exists a Condorcet winner, namely the level of the public bad that is ideal for
the median of the ownership distribution. The selected level of the public bad is implicitly
determined by the f.o.c.
g0(x) [f 0(1) + m] = D0(x): (8)
This equation implicitly denes the equilibrium level of the public bad as a func-
tion of votersbeliefs ; write this relationship as x(). Applying the theorem on the
di¤erentiation of implicit functions reveals that dx=d < 0.
The action zi is taken by any agent i =2 fa; jg so as to minimize the expected loss
Li = [(1  )z2i + (zi   1)2]:
The optimal choice is
zi = :
Let  = Pr(! = 1js) denote the probability assigned to state 1 by agents a and j.
Straightforward computations establish that their optimal action is za = z

j = . Notice,
for later use, that in equilibrium La = Lj = (1  ).
10Since they have no mass, we may safely neglect the role of agents a and j on the voting outcome.
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3.3 Mass communication
In the communication stage of the model, the journalist observes a signal s 2 f0; 1g and
thereupon reports a message r 2 f0; 1g to the agents. Based on this message, agents
beliefs  about the state are formed.
If a media coalition was formed at date t = 1, the report r is chosen so as to maximize
the average of the journalists and his associates utility; hence it solves
max g (x()) [f 0(1) + c]  D (x())  j
2
jr   sj   (1  ), (9)
where  = Pr(! = 1jr) is the probability assigned to state 1 by all other agents, c equals
(a + j)=2, and j may be either 0 or . If no media coalition is in place, the journalist
selects the report so as to solve
max g (x()) [f 0(1) + j]  D (x())  jjr   sj   (1  ). (10)
In either case, the medias optimal strategy depends on the journalists type. If the
intrinsic motivation of the idealistic type is su¢ ciently strong, the idealistic type only
cares about being honest. This case is posited for the rest of the analysis.
Assumption 1 For any  2 [0; 1] the solution to
max g (x(Pr(! = 1jr))) [f 0(1) + ]  D (x(Pr(! = 1jr)))  
2
jr   sj
always has r = s.
By making  large enough, it can be guaranteed that the idealistic type will always
truthfully report the signal. Assumption 1 considerably shortens the treatment without
signicant loss of insight.
If the journalist is of the opportunistic type, his report needs not coincide with the
signal. Informally, the following two equilibrium requirements have to be met: rst, the
report delivered by the media maximizes their objective function, given the way in which
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beliefs are formed; second, beliefs can be deduced from the medias optimal strategy using
Bayesrule.
I now begin characterizing the equilibria of the subgame starting at date t = 2. The
player that chooses the report - which may be either the journalist or a coalition - will
simply be called the media and denoted by M 2 fj; cg.
Lemma 1 There exists a scalar e > m such that the following holds: if M  e, there
exists an equilibrium of the subgame in which the opportunistic journalist always reports
0, independently of the signal; if M < e, such an equilibrium does not exist.
This result establishes that a systematic news bias can be an optimal strategy for the
media if the ownership share of those who control the media is su¢ ciently large. The
intuition is as follows. Letting the amount of the public bad increase boosts the rms
prot. If those in control of the media are entitled to a larger prot share than the one
which goes to the median voter, the media prefer a larger amount of the public bad than
the one preferred by the median voter. In this case, the opportunistic journalist will
report that the public bad is not likely to be harmful (r = 0) even if the actual signal is
that the public bad is likely to be harmful (s = 1).
Because of the conict of interest, the public will be unsure whether the media are
honest. Thus, an optimistic message (r = 0) will not be completely believed. Voters
realize that with opportunistic journalist and economically interested media an optimistic
report conveys no information, while with the idealistic journalist an optimistic report
means that the good state (! = 0), has probability p. By Bayesrule voters will then





This probability is larger than 1 p because the media are not entirely credible. Therefore,
rationality puts an upper bound to the extent of beliefs manipulation by means of media
reports. The probability q assigned to state 1 is however strictly less than 1=2, the prior
probability of that state. Therefore, those in control of the media are indeed able to
manipulate the votersbeliefs.
If the prot share of the media is close to the median voters one, the interests of the
media and those of the median voter will almost be aligned. In such a case it does not
pay to mislead the electorate, since the ensuing level of the public bad would be too large
even for the media; thus, a strategy of optimistic misreporting will not be played if those
who control the media are ordinary people.
Lemma 2 There exists a scalar 0 < m such that the following holds: if M  0, there
exists an equilibrium of the subgame in which the opportunistic journalist always reports
1, independently of the signal; if M > 
0 such an equilibrium does not exist.
The interpretation of this result mirrors the previous one. Those who control the
media might have interests that are in conict with those of the median voter because
the former are signicantly poorer than the median voter. In this case, media bias entails
a systematic reporting of pessimistic messages, so as to reduce the amount of the public
bad desired by the electorate.
Lemma 3 There exist scalars  and b, with b > m >  such that the following holds: if
M 2 [;b], there exists an equilibrium of the subgame in which the opportunistic journalist
correctly reports what he observes; if M =2 [;b] such an equilibrium does not exist.
This result establishes that the interests of those in control of the media have to be
similar to those of the median voter in order for an honest equilibrium to exist. In this
case, all information is transmitted to voters.
The optimistic misreporting equilibrium of Lemma 1, the pessimistic misreporting
equilibrium of Lemma 2, and the honest equilibrium of Lemma 3 are the only types of
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equilibria in pure strategies admitted by the subgame. The equilibrium correspondence
can be characterized as follows:
Proposition 1 There are ve possible regimes:
if M < , only a pessimistic misreporting equilibrium exists;
if   M  0, both a honest and a pessimistic misreporting equilibrium exist;
if 0 < M < e, only a honest equilibrium exists;
if e  M  b, both a honest and an optimistic misreporting equilibrium exist;
if M > b, only an optimistic misreporting equilibrium exists.
As a corollary, if the distribution of ownership is egalitarian, M = m = 1 and only
the honest equilibrium exists.
3.4 Forming a media coalition
The decision of building a coalition must be optimal given the way in which the medias
reports a¤ect votersbeliefs about the damage; these beliefs have to be consistent with the
journalists optimal formation of a coalition. The incentive to collude heavily depends on
the journalists interests, as captured by his share j. In order to simplify the exposition,
I assume that the journalists stake in the rm is not too di¤erent from the median:
Assumption 2 j 2 (0;e).
As implied by Proposition 1, this assumption guarantees that even the opportunistic
journalist will make a truthful report if he does not collude with anybody.
Proposition 2 (i) In an honest equilibrium, the journalist has no associate. (ii) In
an optimistic misreporting equilibrium, the opportunistic journalist associates with the
richest agent. (iii) In a pessimistic misreporting equilibrium, the opportunistic journalist
associates with the poorest agent.
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In case of an honest equilibrium, there is no scope for colluding since the journalist has
no credible threat to deviate from truthful reporting. In case of a misreporting equilibrium,
he can credibly threaten his associate to switch to truthful reporting if no agreement is
reached. This threat gives the journalist some bargaining power, that he can exploit by
negotiating with an agent that benets from media bias. In an optimistic misreporting
equilibrium, the agents that have a keen interest in media bias are the wealthy ones. In
order to maximize the side payment obtained when colluding, the journalist chooses as
associate the agent with the largest stake in manipulating the electorate, which is the
agent with the largest share in the rm. Conversely, in case of a pessimistic misreporting
equilibrium, the journalist maximizes his income by associating with the agent with the
lowest share in the rm.
The journalist may thus be viewed as taking two decisions: rst, whether to build a
coalition or not, and second, whether to collude with the richest or with the poorest agent
in the economy. In equilibrium, the decision outcome depends upon the extrema and the
median of the ownership distribution, as well as upon the journalists ownership share
j. In the sequel, I establish conditions under which the opportunistic journalist chooses
to be captured by the richest agent, rather than stay independent. In order to focus the
analysis on that issue,
Assumption 3 0 < 0
is made. Since M  0, Assumption 3 implies M > 0. By Proposition 1, no pes-
simistic misreporting equilibrium can exist under Assumption 3. Together with Proposi-
tion 2, this implies that if the journalist has an associate in equilibrium, then a = 1.
How restrictive is Assumption 3? Recall from Lemma 2 that 0 < m. Hence, the
condition in Assumption 3 is automatically met if the ownership share of the median
voter is zero, which is often the case in reality. Intuitively, if the amount of wealth in
possession of the median voter is small, her interests will almost be aligned with those of
the poorest agent, and the latter will have no incentive to manipulate the electorate.
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Proposition 3 There exist scalars e1 = 2e  j and b1 = 2b  j, with b1 > e1 > j,
such that the following holds:
if 1 < e1, the unique equilibrium has an independent journalist and truthful reports;
if 1 > b1, the unique equilibrium has a captured opportunistic journalist and opti-
mistic reports;
if e1  1  b1, both types of equilibrium exist.
Under Assumptions 1-3, the equilibrium can be described as follows. If the degree
of wealth concentration is low, i.e. the wealthiest agent is not too much richer than the
median voter, the journalist stays independent and makes truthful reports. If the degree
of wealth concentration is su¢ ciently high, an opportunistic journalist colludes with the
wealthiest agent in the economy and always reports optimistic messages, independently of
the signal. In this case, the public opinion is manipulated with strictly positive probability.
For intermediate levels of wealth concentration, both honesty and misreporting can be
part of equilibrium behavior.
4 Welfare analysis
Since preferences are quasilinear, an e¢ cient allocation of resources necessarily maximizes
expected total surplus
g(x)f(1)  D(x)  [(1  )z2 + (z   1)2]: (11)






and the e¢ cient level of the private action is
zS = :
In order to conduct a welfare analysis of media capture, one has to evaluate the
expected total surplus achieved in equilibrium from an ex ante point of view, i.e. at
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date t = 0. This surplus is referred to as the (equilibrium) social welfare. Since we
have excluded a pessimistic misreporting equilibrium by Assumption 3, in the sequel
the expression misreporting equilibriumwill always refer to an optimistic misreporting
equilibrium.
Let us suppose that the degree of wealth concentration increases to such an extent
that the equilibrium switches from honest to misreporting. How will social welfare be
a¤ected?
Proposition 4 Social welfare is larger in an honest than in a misreporting equilibrium
if  is su¢ ciently large and / or m is su¢ ciently close to 1.
If there is a su¢ ciently strong private concern with objective information, captured
media induce a welfare loss because the information not transmitted to the population is
very valuable.
If median wealth coincides with average wealth (m = 1), media bias is welfare wors-
ening even if there is no private concern with objective information ( = 0). To grasp the
intuition, notice that according to (11) and (7), expected total surplus coincides with the
indirect expected utility of the agent with average wealth if  = . If the median voter is
endowed with average wealth and votersbeliefs are undistorted, majority voting yields
the ex-ante e¢ cient outcome - see Bergstrom (1979). If median and average wealth coin-
cide but votersbeliefs are biased, majority voting misses the e¢ cient level of the public
bad. Therefore, an honest equilibrium delivers a larger social welfare than a misreporting
equilibrium if the median and the average of the wealth distribution are su¢ ciently close.
Whereas captured media are detrimental to the choice about the private action, their
e¤ect upon the e¢ ciency of the voting outcome depends upon the wealth of the median
voter. In order to see how, consider rst the case where the signal about the state of the
world is 0. Although under both equilibria the media report 0, a misreporting equilibrium
generates a lower expected total surplus than an honest equilibrium. Voters realize that
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in a misreporting equilibrium they receive the optimistic report with strictly positive
probability even if the actual signal is 1. Hence, in a misreporting equilibrium the voters
assessment of the public project is less positive than in an honest equilibrium, and the
electorate selects a lower level of the public bad. But the amount of the public bad in an
honest equilibrium is less than the e¢ cient one because the median voter prots less than
average from the public bad. Hence, the distortion is heavier in a misreporting than in
an honest equilibrium.
The welfare e¤ect can instead go in either direction if signal 1 is observed, in which case
the opportunistic journalist reports 0 in a misreporting and 1 in an honest equilibrium.
If the median voter has a very small ownership share, her ideal level of the public bad
can be much below the e¢ cient one. By knowingly understating the risk of the project,
captured media make the electorate choose a larger amount of the public bad. Although
the selected amount will generally di¤er from the e¢ cient one, it might lead to a larger
total surplus than the one obtained under objective reporting.
The above arguments point out that the paradoxical result of an increase in social
welfare due to media bias is the more likely, the smaller the private concern with infor-
mation ( low) and the smaller the ownership share of the median voter (m low). As
suggested by the following result, even if  and m are zero, captured media are unlikely
to raise social welfare.
Proposition 5 Suppose m =  = 0, g quadratic, and D linear. Social welfare is
larger in a misreporting than in a honest equilibrium, if and only if the share of aggregate
income going to labor is less than 1=2.
In order to get the intuition for this result, it is useful to think of the median voter as a
dictator that chooses the level of the public bad. If the median voter owns no shares, her
income only depends on the wage level. When choosing the amount of the public bad, the
median voter trades o¤ the wage increase and the expected damage. Hence, she does not
internalize the e¤ect of the public bad on prots. The smaller the share of labor income
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in aggregate income, the larger the failure of the median voter to properly internalize
all e¤ects from a larger level of the public bad. This means that if the share of income
going to labor is low, the median voter is a poor decision-maker for society as a whole. In
this case, society might benet from having an informationally distorted decision-maker,
which is the case if the media are corrupt. Under the conditions of Proposition 5, society
benets from captured media only if wages make less than 50 % of national income, a
condition which typically fails to be met in practice.
5 Concluding discussion
As objective news coverage is vital to democracy, captured media can seriously distort
collective decisions. The model presented in this paper has shown that, other things being
equal, an increase in the degree of wealth concentration can undermine objective news
coverage. A high level of wealth concentration can raise the probability of corrupt media
because it provides the media with a patron which has much to benet from manipulating
the electorate and is willing to pay much for this. Captured media induce an e¢ ciency
loss if the wealth of the median voter is close to average wealth or if the information
transmitted by the media has a su¢ ciently large private value. While captured media
do not necessarily diminish social welfare, conditions under which they increase it are
restrictive.
The issue of media independence in a democracy is one with many facets. There are
several respects in which the results presented in this paper could be extended and should
be qualied. I thus conclude by reviewing a few key questions raised by the model.
5.1 Di¤erent policy areas and lobbies
The general insight to be derived from the model is that media bias is more likely to occur
in a democracy if society is polarized. Groups with extreme preferences are those that are
worst served by a well-informed democracy, because their preferences are the most distant
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from those of the median voter. Thus, those groups have relatively strong incentives to
bribe the media in order to inuence the political process. The more polarized a society
is, the stronger those incentives will be.
While a high level of wealth concentration can be seen as a determinant of media
capture in some circumstances, di¤erent determinants of media capture may be at work
in other settings. It seems implausible that wealthy capitalists are those who have the
most to gain from untruthful reporting on all issues. By way of an example, workers in
the trade sector might be those with the strongest incentive to bribe the media in order
to gain political support for protectionism.
How can we identify the group that benets most from media capture? Arguably,
the underlying economic structure has to be explicitly modeled. Di¤erences with respect
to endowments, preferences, technologies, and market structure will generally lead to
di¤erent political-economic equilibria under full information. Thus, those di¤erences will
lead to di¤erent forms of media capture under asymmetric information. By explicitly
modeling the economic structure, one could try to identify the types of media capture
that are associated with various economic settings.
5.2 Long-term e¤ects and demand for news
The current model is a one-shot game in which the medias cost of being untruthful is nil.
However, the interaction between voters, media and interest groups is a long-term one.
Over time, media users learn something about the reliability of media outlets. Moreover,
learning that a media outlet is unreliable may decrease demand, since individuals take
private actions based on the reports delivered by the media.
Including a demand side along with learning into the current model would presumably
diminish the frequency of media bias. By lying, an opportunistic journalist may decrease
the probability assigned by media users that he is the honest type. This may reduce both
future demand for the media outlet and its inuence upon voters. As a consequence, a
su¢ ciently patient journalist may have an incentive to build a reputation for being honest.
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He would then reap the gains from that reputation in the nal part of the relationship.
To illustrate, the journalist may take a pro-poor stance on a number of relatively minor
issues in order to build a reputation of being leftwing and therefore gain more inuence
when taking a pro-rich stance on a crucial issue.
A feature of demand that may a¤ect the probability of media bias in an important
way is the presence of conrmatory preferences. Media users may desire to read news that
agrees with their prior views. If this taste is su¢ ciently strong, the media may display a
conformist bias even if they are not captured.
I have discussed the incentives for medias news bias in a situation in which media
users rationally recognize the possibility of capture and misreporting. Alternatively, the
assumption of Bayesian rationality could be abandoned. Based on research in cognitive
psychology, various judgement heuristics could be posited, and their implications for me-
dias inuence on voters could be investigated. Interestingly, the main result of this paper
would carry over to a situation in which voters are naive and always believe the media. A
more concentrated wealth distribution increases the bribe that the journalist could obtain
by forming a coalition with the wealthy in order to inuence voters. A way to state the
contribution of this paper is therefore to point out that the danger of media capture by
interest groups exists even if media users fully understand the potential incentives of the
media to manipulate the news.
5.3 Competition and regulation
The model in this paper portrays the benchmark case of an unregulated media monopoly.
In future work, it would be interesting to study to what extent oligopolistic competition
in the media sector promotes objective news coverage. Clearly, the answer will depend on
the degree of correlation across the oligopolistsprivately observed signals. This suggests
the importance of having a peek inside the black box of how the media collect information
for their users.
The model could also be enriched to consider the role of public media. In some
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countries, public media organizations are highly esteemed for their reliability. In others,
especially less developed countries, state-owned media are just the mouthpiece of the
ruling party. It is important to understand how the governance structure of public media
should be designed to promote their objectivity and accuracy. The impact of independent
media on the reporting policy of potentially captured ones is still another issue that needs
more research and that may be attacked using the framework developed in this paper.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
A pure strategy for the opportunistic type (j = 0) indicates which message is sent
when a given signal is observed. There are four possible pure-strategy pairs: (0; 0),
(1; 1), (0; 1), (1; 0). The rst element of each vector indicates the medias report when the
observed signal is 0 and the second element indicates the report when signal 1 is observed.
Suppose that in the case of the opportunistic type, the strategy pair (0; 0) is played; what
inferences will agents draw about the state of the world?
If voters receives a pessimistic report (r = 1), they will be sure that the journalist is
idealistic and is truthfully reporting the signal. Hence,
Pr(! = 1jr = 1) = Pr(! = 1js = 1):
By Bayesrule, agents will then assign probability p to state 1. The voting outcome will
thus be x(p) < x(1=2), where the latter represents the selected level of the public bad
when no information is conveyed by the media.
If voters receive an optimistic report (r = 0), they will be unsure whether the journalist
is opportunistic (in which case the report conveys no information) or idealistic (in which






(p+ 1  ) + 1
2
[(1  p) + 1  ]




is the probability assigned to state 1. Notice that q 2 (1  p; 1=2) and therefore x(q) >
x(1=2).
Given those inferences, what is the optimal strategy for the media in case j = 0? Let
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the medias payo¤ be denoted as
MM(; ) = VM(; )  (1  ); (13)
where
Vi(; ) = g (x
()) [f 0(1) + i]  D (x())
denotes agent is payo¤ derived from the voting outcome if the public assigns probability
 to state 1 and its true probability is .
First, suppose that M  m. It can be shown that strategy (1; 0) is then strongly
dominated by (0; 0), while strategy (1; 1) is strongly dominated by (0; 1). In order to see
it, consider the payo¤s of the coalition if signal 0 is observed:
MM(; 1  p) = VM(; 1  p)  (1  ):
By examining how the report a¤ects the voting outcome, it can now be shown that
honesty dominates misreporting. If, upon observing 0, the media report 1,  = p and the
level of the public bad will be x(p); if the media report 0, that level will be x(q) > x(p).
Suppose for the moment that M = m. Since the probability of state 1 is 1  p, the ideal
level of the public bad for the media is in this case x(1   p) > x(q). Suppose now





f 0(1) + M
, (14)
where  = 1   p in the present case. Since the function on the l.h.s. of (14) is strictly
decreasing in the level of the public bad, the preferred level is strictly increasing in M ;
hence, it must be larger than x(1 p). Since preferences are single-peaked, VM(q; 1 p) >
VM(p; 1   p). Telling the truth is thus optimal if s = 0; hence, strategy (0; 0) dominates
strategy (1; 0) and (0; 1) dominates (1; 1).
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The optimal strategy is therefore either telling the truth or (0; 0). In order to see
which is the optimal one, compute the payo¤s of the media if the observed signal is 1. By
(13), the net gain of misreporting is
MM(q; p) MM(p; p) = VM(q; p)  VM(p; p):
Hence, (0; 0) is an equilibrium if and only if
VM(q; p)  VM(p; p)  0;
where
VM(q; p) VM(p; p) = [g (x(q)) g (x(p))] [f 0(1) + M] p[D (x(q)) D (x(p))]: (15)
The net gain of misreporting is strictly increasing in M because g0 > 0 and x(q) > x(p).
Consider the case in which M = m. Then, x(p) is the medias ideal level of the public
bad, so that VM(q; p) < VM(p; p). Consider now the case in which M = 1, 1 ! +1 and
thus M ! +1. Since, by equation (14), the medias ideal level of the public bad goes to
+1 if M does the same and since preferences are single-peaked, x(q) delivers a larger
payo¤ than x(p): VM(q; p) > VM(p; p). Hence, there exists a critical level e > m such
that VM(q; p)  VM(p; p)  0 if and only if M  e.
It remains to be shown that (0; 0) cannot be an equilibrium if M < m. This follows
from (15), which shows that (0; 0) is dominated by (0; 1) if M < m. Hence, an equilibrium
with (0; 0) exists if and only if M  e. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2.
The proof is symmetric to the previous one and will only be sketched. If (1; 1) is the
medias strategy, then the public assigns probability 1   p to the bad state if r = 0 is
observed, and probability t 2 (1=2; p) if r = 1 is observed.
If M  m, the optimal strategy of the media, given the above inferences, is either
(0; 1) or (1; 1). Hence, there is a pessimistic misreporting equilibrium if
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VM(t; 1  p)  VM(1  p; 1  p)  0;
which can be written as
[g (x(1  p))  g (x(t))] [f 0(1) + M]  (1  p)[D (x(1  p)) D (x(t))]: (16)
Since x(1   p) > x(t), the net gain of misreporting is a decreasing function of
M . If M = m, then, x(1   p) is the medias ideal level of the public bad, so that
VM(t; 1   p) < VM(1   p; 1   p). If M =  f 0(1)=, then the term on the l.h.s. of (16)
is zero, and thus VM(t; 1   p) < VM(1   p; 1   p). Hence, there exists 0 < m such that
(1; 1) is an equilibrium if and only if M  0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3
Suppose that the optimal strategy of both types is (0; 1). By receiving message 0,
voters will infer that state 1 has probability 1  p. Hence, the level x(1  p) of the public
bad will result. By receiving message 1, voters will infer that state 1 has probability p.
Hence, the level x(p) < x(1  p) of the public bad will result.
If M  m, for similar reasons as in the proof of Lemma 1, given the above inferences
it never pays for the opportunistic type to use the strategies (1; 0) or (1; 1). Telling the
truth is therefore better than misreporting if and only if MM(p; p) MM(1  p; p) or
VM(1  p; p)  VM(p; p)  0: (17)
Using the same arguments as in the previous proofs shows that a critical level b > m
exists such that the optimal strategy of the media is (0; 1) if and only if M  b.
If M  m, in order for (0; 1) to be optimal, it is su¢ cient that it is better than (1; 1).
Hence, there is a honest equilibrium if and only if MM(1  p; 1  p) MM(p; 1  p) or
VM(p; 1  p)  VM(1  p; 1  p)  0: (18)
Using the same arguments as before, there exists a critical level < m such that the
optimal strategy of the media is (0; 1) if and only if M . Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 1.
We have to show that b > e and that 0 > .
The treshold value e can be determined by setting the r.h.s. of (15) equal to zero and
substituting M with e, from which one obtainsh
f 0(1) + ei = pD (x(q)) D (x(p))
g (x(q))  g (x(p)) : (19)
A similar procedure for b, as deduced from (17), yields
h
f 0(1) + bi = pD (x(1  p)) D (x(p))
g (x(1  p))  g (x(p)) :
Therefore, e < b if and only if
D (x(q)) D (x(p))
g (x(q))  g (x(p)) <
D (x(1  p)) D (x(p))
g (x(1  p))  g (x(p)) :






(1  p)  x(q)] +D0p;q[x(q)  x(p)]
g0q;1 p[x(1  p)  x(q)] + g0p;q[x(q)  x(p)]
;
where g0p;q 2 (g0(x(q)); g0(x(p))), g0q;1 p 2 (g0(x(1 p)); g0(x(q))) ,D0p;q 2 [D0(x(p)); D0(x(q))]
and D0q;1 p 2 [D0(x(q)); D0(x(1  p))] are appropriately chosen scalars. Simplifying the









where   [x(1 p) x(q)]=[x(q) x(p)] is strictly positive. The last condition is met








which is true since g0p;q > g
0
q;1 p > 0 and D
0
q;1 p  D0p;q > 0. Hence, e < b.
Let us now show by a similar method that 0 > .
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The treshold value 0 is implicitly determined by letting (16) hold as an equality, which
yields
[f 0(1) + 0] = (1  p)D (x
(1  p)) D (x(t))
g (x(1  p))  g (x(t)) : (20)
The threshold value  is obtained from (18) as
[f 0(1) + ] = (1  p)D (x
(1  p)) D (x(p))
g (x(1  p))  g (x(p)) :
Therefore, 0 > if and only if
D (x(1  p)) D (x(t))
g (x(1  p))  g (x(t)) >
D (x(1  p)) D (x(p))
g (x(1  p))  g (x(p)) :






(1  p)  x(t)] +D0p;t[x(t)  x(p)]
g0t;1 p[x(1  p)  x(t)] + g0p;t[x(t)  x(p)]
;
where g0p;t 2 (g0(x(t)); g0(x(p))), g0t;1 p 2 (g0(x(1 p)); g0(x(t))) ,D0p;t 2 [D0(x(p)); D0(x(t))]
and D0t;1 p 2 [D0(x(t)); D0(x(1   p))] are appropriately chosen scalars. Simplifying the











where   [x(t)   x(p)]=[x(1   p)   x(t)] is strictly positive. The condition above is








which is true since g0p;t > g
0
t;1 p > 0 and D
0
t;1 p  D0p;t > 0. Hence, < 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.
(i) First, consider the case in which the journalists reporting strategy in equilibrium
is (0; 1). Since the journalists optimal reporting strategy is (0; 1) if no coalition is in
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place, building a coalition does not change the level of the public bad. Furthermore, the
true signal is revealed to all media users. Hence, no surplus is generated by forming a
coalition. Arbitrarily small costs of building a coalition entail that no coalition is formed.
(ii) Second, suppose that the strategy played by the media in the continuation game
is (0; 0) if the journalist is opportunistic, which entails public beliefs Pr(! = 1jr = 0) = q
and Pr(! = 1jr = 1) = p. Suppose that the journalist has started negotiations with agent
n. An agreement between j and n species four pairs (rjs ; b
j
s ), namely the report to the
public and the side payment to the journalist, conditional on the journalistanouncement
of his type j 2 f0; g and the jointly observed signal s 2 f0; 1g. According to the
generalized Nash solution, the bargining parties agree that at each realization of the
random variables the obtained surplus is split in equal parts if this agreement is incentive
compatible [Harsanyi and Selten (1972)]. Hence, assuming for the moment incentive
compatibility, the payo¤ to the journalist equals his fallback payo¤plus half of the surplus
obtained by the coalition.
In order to determine the fallback payo¤s of the bargainers, recall that in case of
disagreement the journalist unilaterally sets the report. Since j 2 (0;e), the journalists
optimal strategy in case of disagreement is also (0; 1) if he is the opportunistic type.
Therefore, agent n learns the true signal with certainty even if the negotiations with j
break down. Furthermore, the report in case of disagreement is the same as in case of an
agreement if j =  or if j = 0 and s = 0. This implies that the only case in which there
may possibly exist a strictly positive surplus is j = 0 and s = 1.
If the journalist is opportunistic, he maximizes his payo¤ by being in a coalition with
the agent that obtains the largest benet from switching from r = 1 to r = 0 if the signal
is s = 1. This benet is given by
Vn(q; p)  Vn(p; p) = [g (x(q))  g (x(p))] [f 0(1) + n]  p[D (x(q)) D (x(p))]:
Since this expression strictly increases with n, then n = 1. Thus, if a coalition is built,
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then a = 1 and the transfer payment received by the journalist from his associate amounts
to
b01 =
[g (x(q))  g (x(p))] [f 0(1) + (1 + j=2)]  p[D (x(q)) D (x(p))]
2
: (21)
From the above reasoning it follows that in an optimistic misreporting equilibrium,
if the journalist has an associate, a = 1 and the proposed agreement is (r0 ; b

0) = (0; 0),
(r1 ; b













1 is given by (21). Since
the equilibrium is supposed to be (0; 0) the surplus generated by this coalition is indeed
positive, and the coalition is built.
It remains to be checked whether the above agreement is incentive compatible. Since
the two types pool if s = 0, only the case s = 1 is of interest. If the opportunistic type
truthfully reveals his type to the associate, his expected utility is Vj(q; p) p(1 p)+ b01,
which is larger than Vj(p; p)   p(1   p), the expected utility derived by claiming to be
the idealistic type, because the latter utility is the one corresponding to the journalists
fallback payo¤.
The IC-condition for the idealistic type is
Vj(p; p)  p(1  p)  Vj(q; p)  p(1  p)  + b01:
Inserting (21), this can be rewritten as
[Vj(p; p)  Vj(q; p)] + 1
2
Vc(p; p)  1
2
Vc(q; p)  :
Assumption 2 implies that the term in the square bracket is positive. Hence the IC-
condition is met if
1
2
Vc(p; p)  1
2
Vc(q; p)  :
This is actually the case, since from Assumption 1 it follows that
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(iii) Suppose now that the strategy played by the media in the continuation game is
(1; 1) if the journalist is opportunistic. The proof that a = 0 in this case is analogous
to the one of the previous case. Notice that the journalist seeks the associate with the
maximum gain from switching from r = 0 to r = 1 when s = 0. This gain equals
Vi(t; 1  p)  Vi(1  p; 1  p) and is therefore strictly decreasing with i. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.
By Assumption 3, M > 
0. By Proposition 1 it then follows that only an honest and
an optimistic misreporting equilibrium can exist.
First, consider the honest equilibrium. By Proposition 2, the journalist has no asso-
ciate in such an equilibrium, hence M = j and, by Lemma 3, j 2 [;b], which is the
case by Assumption 2. In order to prove that no protable deviations exist, consider the
payo¤ to the journalist in case of collusion. The journalist gets a side payment only if he
deviates from honest reporting for some value of the signal. Only two cases need to be
discussed: (0; 0) and (1; 1). Suppose a coalition is formed that agrees on (0; 0). Since the
surplus generated by the coalition is split into equal parts between the journalist and the
associate, the journalist gains from the coalition if and only if the surplus is positive. The
surplus to the coalition generated through misreporting is
VM(1  p; p)  VM(p; p):
By Lemma 3, this gain of misreporting is increasing in M and a critical level b > m
exists such that VM(1   p; p)   VM(p; p)  0 if and only if M  b. Hence, a protable
deviation exists if 1 > 2b j. Consider now deviations that entail a coalition that agrees
on (1; 1). The gain to the coalition from misreporting is
VM(p; 1  p)  VM(1  p; 1  p):
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Because of Lemma 3, the gain of misreporting is decreasing in M and there exists a
critical level < m such that VM(p; 1   p)   VM(1   p; 1   p)  0 if and only if M .
Since M  0  0 > , this condition is always met, which implies that no protable
deviation to (1; 1) exists. Hence, an honest equilibrium exists if and only if 1  2b   j.
Second, consider the optimistic misreporting equilibrium. By Proposition 2, a =
1. Consider a deviation to (0; 1), in which case the journalist has no associate. This
deviation is protable to the journalist if and only if the surplus for the coalition in case
of misreporting,
VM(q; p)  VM(p; p);
is strictly negative. By Lemma 1, there exists a critical level e > m such that VM(q; p) 
VM(p; p)  0 if and only if M is larger than e. Hence, a protable deviation exists if
1 < 2e   j. Consider now whether a deviation to (1; 1) can be protable. A necessary
condition for this to be the case is that there exists a coalition that generates a positive
surplus if r = 1 is reported when s = 0; this necessary condition is thus
VM(p; 1  p)  VM(q; 1  p) < 0:
It can be shown that this condition is met if and only if M is smaller than a critical
value. By the same method as in the proof of Proposition 1, it can be shown that this
critical value is strictly smaller than . Since 0  0 > , also that critical value is
strictly negative, which implies that a deviation to (1; 1) cannot be protable. Hence, an
optimistic misreporting equilibrium exists if and only if 1  2e   j. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4.
Denote by S(x; ) the interim total surplus derived from the collective action when an
amount x of the public bad is selected and the probability of the bad state is . Denote
by L(; ) the aggregate consumption loss when action  is taken and the probability of
the bad state is . Social welfare in an honest equilibrium amounts to
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[S(x(1  p); 1  p)  L(1  p; 1  p)] + 1
2
[S(x(p); p)  L(p; p)]:
In a misreporting equilibrium, the level reached by social welfare is
1
2
fS(x(q); 1  p) L(q; 1  p) + [S(x(p); p) L(p; p)] + (1  )[S(x(q); p) L(q; p)]g:
The change in social welfare induced by media bias can thus be written as





[S(x(q); 1  p)  S(x(1  p); 1  p)]




(1  )[S(x(q); p)  S(x(p); p)]




fL(1  p; 1  p)  L(q; 1  p) + (1  )[L(p; p)  L(q; p)]g
is the expected change with respect to the consumption loss.
In order to show the rst part of the proposition, notice that  only a¤ects L. Since





(q   1 + p)2 + (1  )(p  q)2  0:
Since L goes to  1 if  goes to +1, a su¢ ciently large  implies  < 0.
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In order to prove the second part of the proposition, we rst show that S(x(q); 1 p) <
S(x(1 p); 1 p) and hence0 < 0. Let xS() = argmaxS(x; ). Notice that the e¢ cient
level of the public bad is the one preferred by the agent with average wealth, i.e.  = 1.
Since the ideal level for the median voter increases with m and the latter is smaller than
1, we have xS() > x(). Therefore we have
xS(1  p) > x(1  p) > x(q):
From the strict concavity of S(x; 1 p), it then follows that S(x(1 p); 1 p) > S(x(q); 1 
p).
In the last step we show that 1  0 if m is close enough to 1. If m = 1, then
x(p) = xS(p). Therefore, S(x(p); p) > S(x(q); p), which implies that 1 < 0. By a
continuity argument, it follows that S(x(p); p)  S(x(q); p) if m is close enough to 1,
which implies 1  0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5.
If  = 0, then L = 0 and  > 0 if and only if
1 >  0;
which may be rewritten as
(1  )[S(x(q); p)  S(x(p); p)] > S(x(1  p); 1  p)  S(x(q); 1  p): (22)








S(x;) = af(1)  d + (bf(1)  e)x   cf(1)x2:
From this expression it follows that
S(x1;)  S(x2;) = (x2   x1) [e   bf(1) + cf(1)(x1 + x2)] (24)
33
for any x1, x

2. Inserting (23) into (24) yields










S(x(1  p); 1  p)  S(x(q); 1  p) = e
2
2cf 0(1)




(1  p+ q)  1 + p

:











(1  p+ q)  1 + p

:








By (4) and (5), f 0(1)=f(1) is indeed equal to the share of income going to labor. Q.E.D.
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